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Langer: Can Anyone Stop Big Brother? New York's Drunk Driving Laws Do Not

NOTE
CAN ANYONE STOP BIG BROTHER? NEW
YORK'S DRUNK DRIVING LAWS DO NOT PASS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST
I.

INTRODUCTION

At midnight on February 22, 1999, New York City implemented a
new policy to seize cars from individuals arrested for drunk driving offenses.' Nassau County 2 followed its New York City counterpart and
implemented its own and almost identical policy the next day In both
jurisdictions, the vehicles seized would be subject to forfeiture.4 This
new police action has invoked existing law, reinterpreted to combat the
high rate of drunk driving offenses.' Yet it is questionable whether such
action succeeds in overcoming the Constitutional framers' hurdles created to protect individual liberty from the overreaching arms of government. As the United States Supreme Court so eloquently held:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they

1. See Dan Morrison, DWI Car Seizures to Start, NEWSDAY (Queens), Feb. 21, 1999, at
A37.
2. Nassau County is a jurisdiction within New York. It is on Long Island, just outside of
New York City.
3. See Al Baker & Barbara J. Durkin, DWI War Nets 4 Cars/CriticismLeveled as Nassau
Starts Get-Tough Policy on Drunk Drivers, NEWSDAY (Nassau), Feb. 25, 1999, at A5.
4. See Al Baker, Seize and Desist: Nassau to Impound Most Cars After Arrest for DWI,
NEVSDAY (Nassau), Feb. 24, 1999, at A3. Seizure of the vehicle would take place upon arrest and
then the forfeiture proceedings would commence shortly thereafter. See id.
5. See N.Y. CrrY ADmIN. CODE § 14-140 (1999) (describing the appointment, duties, and
security functions of the property clerk); NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-7.0 (1966)
(describing the functions of the property clerk). These laws have been on the books for a number
of years. The government simply applied them to the offense of driving while intoxicated
('DWI").
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were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry
from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy 6government officials no less, and perhaps
more, than mediocre ones.
This new policy of forfeiture, while a commendable effort to deter people from driving drunk, has serious Constitutional implications. However, since this is such a new issue, there has only been one case that
has had the opportunity to consider it.7 Interestingly enough, the First
Department of the Appellate Division of New York upheld the new
policy, holding that it withstands Constitutional muster.' This opinion,
as will be seen throughout this Note, is riddled with flaws. There have
been no other challenges thus far.
Concededly, there is a strong policy argument in favor of seizure
and/or forfeiture. Drunk driving is a serious social problem which needs
law to intervene and implement a workable solution. Yet, the current
forfeiture policy effectively lets the police seize a defendant's car upon
arrest. The defendant cannot get the car back until there is a disposition
in the criminal proceeding. The defendant is thus deprived of his vehicle
from the moment of arrest, despite not being convicted of any crime. As
will be seen throughout this Note, allowing the government to intrude in
this fashion violates specific Constitutional protections.
Part II commences with a brief examination of the history of forfeiture generally, including the New York forfeiture statutes in question.
It also briefly examines Grinbergv. SafirY the only New York case in
which a court has rendered a decision on the issue of the forfeiture of
vehicles subsequent to a drunk driving arrest. Parts III, IV, and V, focus
on three Constitutional provisions and their application to the statutesdue process,'0 excessive fines," and double jeopardy, respectively.
Each section includes an analysis of the leading cases on each issue.
They also incorporate an analysis of Grinberg in light of the leading
cases.' Serious doubt is raised as to the validity of the Grinberg decision.
6. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
7. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct. 1999), aft'd, 698 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App.

Div. 1999).
8. See Grinberg,698 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
9. 694 N.Y.S.2d 316.

10. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
11. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
12. See U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
13. Part V does not provide an analysis of Grinbergbecause Mr. Grinberg did not challenge
the law on double jeopardy grounds. See Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 322. Therefore, the Grinberg
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II.

A.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND

History of Forfeiture

Forfeiture laws have been applied throughout the centuries. 4 Their
original form and derivation appears to come from the Bible, in the
Book of Exodus: "And if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die,
the ox shall be surely stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten; but the
owner of the ox shall be quit.' '15 The "stoned ox" is the analog of today's
forfeited property. Actions against non-human transgressors were
treated as crimes against the community as a whole, and the community
was considered the "common executioner."' 16 Therefore, the public
needed to participate in the act of eradication as a demonstration of consciously and effectively restoring the order that had been disturbed.
This form of punishment survived the ancient times and was
known in early English law as a "deodand..'.. "The word 'deodand' derives from the Latin phrase 'deo dandum,' which literally means "'given
to God.""..9 Early cases adjudged certain inanimate objects that caused
deaths to be deodands.20 "Thus, for example, a boat that capsized, causing a fisherman to die, was beached, cursed, and allowed to rot, and a
horse that carried a man over a cliff or into water, drowning him, was
forfeited.' The concept of finding objects guilty was adopted in the
United States in early Supreme Court cases, ensuring that the tradition
would endure.'

court did not make anything other than a conclusory double jeopardy analysis and did not base its
holding on double jeopardy principles. See id.
14. For a discussion on the history of forfeiture, see Paul Schiff Berman, An Anthropological
Approach to Modem ForfeitureLaw: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 18-31 (1999).

15. Exodus 21:28. The word "quit," when used as an adjective, means "released from obligation, charge, or penalty." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1867 (1993).
Thus, the ox responsible for the goring was forfeited, and its owner subject to no other penalty.
16. See Berman, supra note 14, at 24.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 25.
19. Id.

20. See id. at 26. This included trees, ships, boats, carts, horses, oxen, and mill wheels. See
id.
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22. See id. at31.
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The ForfeitureStatutes

Two statutes that are currently being utilized to implement the
drunk driving vehicle forfeitures are introduced in this section. The first
is section 14-140 of the New York City Administrative Code
("NYCAC"),2' and the second is its Nassau County counterpart, section
8-7.0 of the Nassau County Administrative Code ("NCAC"). Both
laws authorize the property clerk in each respective jurisdiction to retain
the vehicle, and in the proper circumstances, to commence an action to
forfeit such vehicle.5
For example, section 14-140(4)(b) states that "all property ...suspected of having been used as a means of committing crime or employed in aid or furtherance of crime ...[shall come] into the custody
of and [be] kept by the property clerk."2 6 This section applies to property
taken from the "person or possession" of a prisoner.2 Arguably, an individual's car is within his possession when he is driving it, and therefore, is subject to this provision. Section 14-140(4)(e)(2) further states
that when "property ...has been used as a means of committing crime
or employed in aid or in furtherance of crime ...any such property may
be used or converted to use for the purpose of the [police] department or
any city, state or federal agency."'' This was precisely the statute that
gave the New York City police department the authorization to seize
Pavel Grinberg's 1988 Acura.29
The Nassau County statute is very similar. It provides that the
property clerk may take charge of all property "[t]aken from the person
of a prisoner."30 It also allows the county to commence a civil forfeiture
action when the property is the instrumentality of a misdemeanor
crime." Under New York law, a first time conviction for driving while

23. See N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE § 14-140 (1999).
24. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMiN. CODE § 8-7.0(b)(2) (1966).
25. See N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE § 14-140; NASSAU COUNTY ADMIN. L. § 8-7.0.
26. N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE § 14-140(4)(b).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 14-140(4)(e)(2).
29. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319-20 (Sup. Ct. 1999), aff'd, 698 N.Y.S.2d
218 (App. Div. 1999).
30. NASSAU COuNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-7.0(b)(2).
31. See id. § 8-7.0(g)(2)-(3). Instrumentality of a crime is defined as "any property, other
than real property ... whose use contributes directly and materially to the commission of any offense." Id. § 8-7.0(g)(1)(d).
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intoxicated 32 ("DWI") is a misdemeanor,33 while subsequent convictions
are felonies.34
C. The Grinberg Decision
In Grinberg v. Safir,35 Pavel Grinberg's car was seized at the time
of his drunk driving arrest. 6 Subsequently, he brought a mandamus proYork,
ceeding37 to compel the police commissioner of the City of New
s
Howard Safir, and the property clerk, to return his car to him.
The court in Grinbergheld that the New York City forfeiture pro-

vision did not violate any constitutional safeguards. 39 It held specifically

that, inter alia, there was no violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause nor of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.40 However, the court did not make anything other than a conclusory double jeopardy analysis because Mr. Grinberg did not challenge
the law on such grounds. 4' As will be seen in each respective individual
section, both the due process and excessive fines analyses are suspect.
III. DuE PROCESS-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
A.

Possibilityof Pre-DeprivationHearings

The first part of the analysis concerns due process implications.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

32. "Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such
person has .10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood ... ,breath,
urine, or saliva.... N.Y. VEH. & TRW. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1996).
33. See id. § 1193(1)(b).
34. See id. § I193(1)(c). As a felony offense, the state can choose to execute a forfeiture
proceeding. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1311(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1997). That forfeiture provision is not
being challenged in this Note.
35. 694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 698 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1999).
36. See Grinberg,694 N.Y.S.2d at 319-20.
37. New York's mandamus proceeding falls within Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1994).
38. See Grinberg,694 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
at 328.
39. See id.

40. See id. at 323-28. Mr. Grinberg also argued that the seizure violated his right against
unreasonable seizures, based on the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Arat 322-23. The court rejected that
ticle I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution. See id.
at 323. This Note, however, does not
argument holding that no such violation occurred. See id.
focus on those grounds.
41. See id. at 322 n.5.
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without due process of law." 42 The New York State Constitution has almost identical language.43
When the Government seizes property to assert ownership and
control over the property, the Government action must comply with the
Due Process Clause.44 It is clear that the function of the drunk driving
forfeiture statutes is to achieve the goal of asserting ownership and control over property. 4 "[Elven the temporary or partial impairments to
property rights ...are sufficient to merit due process protection. '
Therefore, due process protection must exist when the government attempts to forfeit a vehicle.
Central to the Constitution's command of due process is the right
to prior notice and a hearing.47 "The purpose of this requirement is not
only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual ...[but also] to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment
[and] to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of
''s
property.
However, this is not without exception. These limited instances are
tolerated when there are "extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing
until after the event."49 Therefore, it is possible to delay notice and a
hearing until after the deprivation if the right circumstances exist. The
Supreme Court, in Fuentes v. Shevin," laid out the following framework
for instances when pre-deprivation hearings were dispensed with:
First, [when] the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, [when] there
has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, [when] the State
has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person
initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
5 statute, that it
was necessary and justified in the particular instance. '

42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
43. See N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.").

44. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43,52 (1993).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991),
See James Daniel GoodReal Property,510 U.S. at 53.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).

50. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
51.

l at 91 (emphasis added).
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This framework was actually a summary of the reasons of earlier decisions where the Court had declared that the due process requirements
2
had been satisfied even though there was no pre-deprivation hearing.1
Some examples of postponement of notice and hearing until after
the seizure are: circumstances necessary to protect the public from contaminated food,53 from misbranded drugs,M and from the economic disaster of a bank failure. 55 Other instances of postponement occurred when
there were exigencies to meet the needs of a national war effort,56 and to
aid in the collection of taxes.- Notably, these situations were, for the
most part, truly extraordinary.
The Court stretched this concept in 1974 in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,5s when it allowed the seizure of a yacht involved
in drug offenses. 9 There, it took the framework from Fuentes, decided
two years earlier, and formulated it into a working test for due process."
In Calero-Toledo, the Court held that the seizure permitted (the government of) Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property.6'
Asserting in rem jurisdiction over the yacht was considered to be a "significant governmental purpose" and therefore satisfied the first Fuentes
prong.62 The Court further held that the seizure without a hearing was
necessary because a yacht would "often be of a sort [of property] that
could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given." 63 This effectively created a
special need for prompt action and thus satisfied the second Fuentes
prong.
The Court based its assertion of jurisdiction argument on an earlier
Supreme Court case.6 In Ownbey v. Morgan, 5 defendant Ownbey, a
non-resident of Delaware, contested the actions of Delaware residents
when they attached his personal property located within Delaware for

52. See id. at 91-92.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306,315 (1908).
See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950).
See Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
See United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 552-53 (1921).
See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
416 U.S. 663 (1974).

59. See id. at 669.
60. See id. at 678-79.

61. See id. at 679.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
at 679 n.13.
65. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
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payment on a debt. 66 The Court in Ownbey allowed the attachment based
on the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty that each state has over the
persons and property within its borders-a fundamental and earlyrecognized jurisdictional principle. When the Court applied this analysis to Calero-Toledo it may have been justified because of the "removability" of the yacht. It does not take a scholar to recognize that a yacht,
allegedly involved in drug transport, will most likely not be available
for forfeiture if it is not seized immediately. This is due in part because
of a yacht's ability to be moved anywhere on the globe, to the multinational aspect of the drug trade, and to the high penalties for drug offenses.
Yet, it is questionable if the same concerns realistically exist in the
case of a drunk driving forfeiture. The Grinberg court's suggestion that
a car is similar to the yacht in Calero-Toledo is borderline ridiculous."
While it is technically true that a car used in a drunk driving offense
may be "'removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if
advance warning of confiscation were given,".'69 it is much less likely
that this would occur than it would in the case of a yacht used in illegal
drug transport. Critics may charge this statement as naYve; therefore, a
further comparison between the two is necessary.
Take the hypothetical situation of a drug dealer who uses a yacht to
transport drugs from one state, or country, to another. Drug crimes are

66. See id. at 99.
67. See id. at 111.

In Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-724, it was shown that the process of foreign
attachment has its fundamental basis in the exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty of
each State over persons and property within its borders.
[A] property owner who absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of a State,
leaving his property within it, must be deemed ... to consent that the State may subject
such property to judicial process to answer demands made against him in his absence.
Id. at 109-11.

68. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 325 (Sup. Ct. 1999). The judge in Grinberg
cites to State v. Konrath,577 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1998), a Wisconsin case, suggesting that the major issue in Konrath was the inability of the police to execute a seizure order of a convicted drunk
driver because the vehicle could not be located. See id. While that is true, the issues litigated in
that case were actually very similar to the due process and double jeopardy discussions of this
Note. See id. In Konrath, the defendant was charged and convicted of his fifth DWI offense. See
id. at 603. Because the forfeiture statutes provided alternatives to forfeiture and were limited to
specific circumstances, they were held, inter alia, to not violate due process. See id. at 613. For
example, forfeiture is an option only after two previous convictions; additionally, alternatives such
as immobilization or ignition interlock devices are available, as well as hardship provisions. See
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.65(6)(a)(1) (West 1999).
69. Grinberg,694 N.Y.S.2d at 325 (quoting Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 679).
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serious offenses with serious consequences. 0 It is highly unlikely that
the yacht will wait around to be forfeited unless it is immediately
seized. The transitory nature of a boat is therefore much greater than a
car because of the car's inability to move off of the land mass that it
travels upon. Boats travel across international boundaries very quickly,
thus necessitating the need for attachment. Contrast that with a drunk
driver charged with his first offense, a misdemeanor under New York
law.7 ' Drunk driving is not the type of offense that would make people
flee from the jurisdiction. While any defendant who posts bail may flee
the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution of any crime, it is much less likely
that a defendant would do so upon being charged with drunk driving.
Additionally, a safeguard provision could allow the prosecuting county
to put a lien on the vehicle, relieving the need for prolonged seizure
without a hearing. Therefore, the Calero-Toledoyacht is not the same as
the Grinbergcar.
Moreover, application of the third Fuentes factor also indicates that
due process is not satisfied under New York law when there is no predeprivation hearing. Regardless of the fact that the person charged with
initiating the forfeiture is a government official and not a private party,
the standards are not under a narrowly drawn statute.72 Contrast the
Wisconsin drunk driving forfeiture statute73 with the New York forfeiture procedural provisions. 4 Section 346.65(6)(a)(1) of the Wisconsin
Statute authorizes forfeiture only in specific instances such as when
there has been two previous drunk driving convictions.7 5 It also provides
for alternatives to forfeiture such as immobilization of the vehicle 76 or
an ignition interlock device.77 There is also a hardship provision. 71

70. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-220.45 (McKinney 2000) (grading drug offenses
from class A misdemeanor to class A-I felony).
71. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(b) (McKinney 1996).
72. See supra text accompanying note 50.
73. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.65(6)(a)(1) (West 1999).
74. See N.Y.CrrY CoMP. R. & REGs. tit. 38, § 12-36 (1999).
75. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.65(6)(a)(1) (West 1999). However, forfeiture is not mandatory. "[Tihe court may order a law enforcement officer to seize a motor vehicle .... Id. (emphasis
added).
76. "'Immobilization device' means a device or mechanism which immobilizes a motor vehicle, making the motor vehicle inoperable." Id. § 340.01.

77. "'Ignition interlock device' means a device which measures the person's alcohol concentration and which is installed on a vehicle in such a manner that the vehicle will not start if the
sample shows that the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration." Id. § 340.01.
78. See id. § 346.65(6)(a)(1). "The court shall not order a motor vehicle equipped with an
ignition interlock device or immobilized if that would result in undue hardshipor extreme inconvenience or would endangerthe health and safety of a person." Id. (emphasis added). But see sec-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1147

No such provisions exist under the New York City forfeiture procedure statutes.7 9 Section 12-36 of the New York City Rules and Regulations ("NYCRR") is very bare compared with Wisconsin law. 0 Essentially, NYCRR section 12-36 spells out the procedures for forfeiture
effected by NYCAC section 14-140, which contains the substantive forfeiture provisions."' NYCRR section 12-36 does not provide any alternatives, nor does it provide for a hardship exception. Furthermore, it
does not matter what type of crime it is or whether or not it is a first offense. Most notably, however, is the fact that under NYCRR section 1236 the property clerk (who has custody of the vehicle) must bring a for-2
feiture proceeding within twenty-five days of the claimant's demand.1
Therefore, if a claimant cannot or does not make a claim (e.g., because
of lack of funds for an attorney, etc.), the statute does not demand the
property clerk to take any action. Such a provision surely cannot be said
to provide proper due process protection. The government, in effect, can
seize an individual's vehicle without a pre-deprivation hearing, and does
not even have to show that it had the right to seize under the particular
circumstances, unless that individual makes a claim. 3 Upon seizing the
vehicle, the government can remain inactive until the owner takes action. In Nassau County, the only protection afforded to a defendant is
that the forfeiture action must be brought within 120 days,s" and, upon
acquittal the vehicle must be returned to the defendant." Thus, it is clear
that these are not the narrowly drawn statutes that Fuentes requires.
In contrast, the Wisconsin statute mandates "the district attorney ...[to] commence an action to forfeit the motor vehicle within 30
days after the motor vehicle [was] seized."'6 It also lists what needs to
be proven at the hearingf The New York statutory scheme is obviously
lacking in this regard because it does not mention anything of the sort.
Additionally, New York law authorizes the immediate suspension
of the defendant's license by the judge at arraignment.88 However, the

tion 346.65(6)(a)(2) where in certain specific circumstances, the forfeiture is mandatory and there
is no immobilization or ignition interlock alternative nor is there a hardship provision.
79. See N.Y. Crry Comp.R. & REGS. tit. 38, § 12-36 (1999).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79.
81. See N.Y. CrrYADMIN. CODE § 14-140(b), (e)(2).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See N.Y. CITY COMP. R. & REGs. tit. 38, § 12-36(a) (1999).
See id.
See NASSAU CouNTY, N.Y., ADmvI. CODE § 8-7.0(g)(5) (1990).
See id. § 8-7.0(g)(7).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 346.65(6)(c) (West 1999).
See id. § 346.65(6)(d).
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(a)-(b) (McKinney 1999).
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defendant has the right at that juncture to request a hardship privilege. 9
If granted, this would allow the defendant to drive to school or work, or
to receive medical treatments." The relevant text of the hardship provision reads:
"[E]xtreme hardship" shall mean the inability to obtain alternative
means of travel to or from the licensee's employment, or to or from
necessary medical treatment for the licensee or a member of the licensee's household, or if the licensee is a matriculating student enrolled in
an accredited school, college or university travel to or from such licensee's school, college or university if such travel is necessary for the
completion of the educational degree or certificate. 9'
Forfeiture without a hearing would render the hardship privilege moot.
If there is a hardship privilege for a license suspension, there should at
least be a hardship privilege for a forfeiture. A driver's license is issued
by the state and is a privilege. A person must pass a driver's test before
he can obtain a license and that license can be revoked or suspended if
the licensee does not behave properly. Thus, ownership of property-a
fundamental property right-should, a fortiori, merit even greater protection. Therefore, the New York statutes in question simply do not
provide adequate due process protection without a pre-deprivation
hearing under Fuentes and must fail under the circumstances.
B. The Mathews Factors
In Mathews v. Eldridge,' a three-part test for due process was announced.93 In Mathews, the plaintiff was receiving disability payments
from the government.' 4 The government decided to terminate the payments. 9 The plaintiff then sued, challenging the administrative procedures as violative of due process, and sought reinstatement of the payments." While the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the procedures as
comporting with the requirements of due process, the Court outlined
three distinct factors to be considered in making its determination. 97

89. See id.
§ l193(2)(e)(7)(e).
90. See id.
91. Id.

92. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 335.
id.
at 323.
id.
at 324.
id. at 324-25.
id.
at 335.
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These factors have been the focus of due process inquiries since their
announcement in 1976.98
The first factor under Mathews considers the private interest that
will be affected by the official action. 99 Addressing the private individual's interest is a natural and fair starting point in the analysis. "'[D]ue
process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.""0 Next, a
court must consider the risk of erroneous deprivation of such private
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.' ' Risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest vis-h-vis the procedure further emphasizes the
non-technical nature of what due process is supposed to protect. The
clause concerning "probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards""' gives the individual an opportunity to argue
that reasonable alternatives are available. Lastly, "the Government's
interest [must be considered], including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
. ' 3 This provides the government with
an opportunity to prove that the functional value of the procedure is
high, and that the alternatives are too burdensome under the circumstances.
In Grinberg v. Safir,'°4 the court refrained from conducting a
Mathews analysis. Instead, in a footnote, the court noted that if it "were
to apply Mathews, the balance would weigh heavily in the [government's] favor."'0 5 Yet under a proper Mathews analysis, the balance
would clearly weigh against the government.
The private interest of an individual whose automobile is seized is
undoubtedly high. In Fuentes v. Shevin,' °6 the Supreme Court held that
the loss of kitchen appliances and household furniture was significant
enough to warrant a pre-deprivation hearing.' °7 In Connecticut v.
98. This test has been utilized in all types of due process concerns. See, e.g., United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (concerning forfeiture of real property
for drug offenses); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49

(1977) (discussing removal of foster children from foster home).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
See id. at 335.
Id.
Id.
694 N.Y.S.2d 316 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 698 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1999).
Grinberg,694 N.Y.S.2d at 325 n.1 1.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).

107. See id. at 89.
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Doehr, 3 the Court held that a state statute authorizing prejudgment attachment of real property without prior notice or hearing was unconstitutional.'09 A pre-deprivation hearing was mandated even though the attachment did not interfere with the owner's use and possession, nor did
it substantially affect the receipt of rental income from existing leases.l"'
[The State correctly points out that these effects do not amount to a
complete, physical, or permanent deprivation of real property; their
impact is less than the perhaps temporary total deprivation of household goods or wages .... Without doubt, state procedures for creating
and enforcing attachments, as with liens, "are subject to the strictures
of due process.""1
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,"2 the Court held
the statute unconstitutional as it did in Doehr, particularly because the
attachment did substantially affect the owner's fundamental property
rights."' Thus, even though a deprivation may be temporary, there is
enough of a private interest to merit due process protection.
Seizing an automobile deprives its owner of the right of ownership,
sale, use, and enjoyment of the vehicle. Even though there has been no
criminal conviction, the vehicle owner can no longer use the car for his
own particular interest, whether it be transportation to employment or
education, access to necessary medical treatment, or even just a pleasure
drive or shopping. Even when public transportation is available as an
alternative, it is entirely possible that the use of public transportation is
not a reasonable alternative. For example, public transportation may not
directly access the desired destination, or the individual may have medical problems, or it is simply too expensive (or more expensive than
driving one's own car) to commute or travel to the particular location
via public transportation. It is also impossible for the owner to sell the
car, and in the case of a financed vehicle, the owner would still be liable
for payments. Additionally, while the cars are impounded they are likely
to be damaged in the county lots in which they are stored. Moreover,
since the forfeitures may not take place for some time, the car's value

108. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
109. See id. at 18.
110. See id. at 16.
111. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
112. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
113. See id. at 54.
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will greatly depreciate. 14 Therefore, it is absolutely clear that the individual's private property interest is substantial.
The risk of erroneous deprivation under these circumstances is also
high. While the NCAC provides some protection by requiring the property clerk to return the vehicle if the defendant is acquitted,"' it still
does not address the problem of a potentially lengthy erroneous deprivation without some type of hearing. A statutorily mandated hearing
would help prevent against improper deprivation.
The New York City forfeiture statutes provide even less protection;
there is no provision requiring the return of the vehicle upon an acquittal.Y6 Thus, there is no available protection against questionable police
conduct or improper application of the law that could lead to an invalid
seizure. Indeed, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani of the City of New York has
indicated that he will pursue seizure of the car, even if the arrested person is later acquitted of the criminal charge.1 7 This is evidence that
abuse of the system could, and does, occur. In fact, New York City requires the property clerk to bring a forfeiture proceeding only if the
claimant makes a demand.' Claiming that the present statutory scheme
effectively prevents against erroneous deprivation is simply not supportable.
A comparison should be made with the New York State forfeiture
provisions as found in Article 13-A of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
("CPLR")."' Article 13-A's forfeiture provisions are activated upon the
commission of a felony offense.' 2 There are many procedural safeguards found within the body of Article 13-A of the CPLR. 121 For example, there exists the right to a trial by jury on any issue of fact.22 It
also sets forth the requisite burdens of proof needed to sustain a forfei-

114. In Nassau County, it was found that after a year of the implementation of the forfeiture
and seizure of 700 vehicles, none of the cars had been sold. See Stephanie McCrummen, Lots of
Seized Cars: Nassau'sDWI Crackdown Has Yet to Yield a Sale at Auction, NEWSDAY (Nassau),
Mar. 21, 2000, at A3.
115. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-7.0(g)(5) (1990).
116. See N.Y.C. CoMP. R. & REGS. tit. 38, § 12-36 (1999); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 14140(b), (e)(2) (1999).
117. See Al Baker, Seize and Desist: Nassau to Impound Most CarsAfter Arrests for DWI,
NEWSDAY (Nassau), Feb. 24, 1999, at A3.
118. See N.Y.C. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 38, § 12-36 (1999).
119. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 1310-1348 (McKinney 1997).
120. See id. §§ 1310(5)-(6), 1311(1)(a)-(b).
121. See, e.g., §§ 1311(2), (3)(a)-(b), 1312(3) (setting forth a number of procedural safeguards
for the property owner).
122. See id. § 1311(2).
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ture proceeding.'" It establishes guidelines for provisional remedies, and
requires that the 'claiming authority' (here, the government) prove that:
[t]here is a substantial probability that the claiming authority will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order may result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction of
the court, or otherwise be unavailable for forfeiture ...[and that] the
need to preserve the availability of the property through the entry of
the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party against whom
the order may operate. 24
Additionally, the CPLR requires that when property is attached without
notice, the claiming authority move for an order confirming the order of
attachment within five days. ' If the claiming authority fails to comply,
the order of attachment is to be vacated, 26 but the claiming authority has
the opportunity to correct any defect. 27' In either case, the claiming
authority has the burden of establishing the grounds for the attachment,
the need for continuing the levy, and the probability of the claiming
authority's success on the merits." This elaborate statutory scheme, as
found in Article 13-A of the CPLR, has been held to comport with the
requirements of due process.' 29
Therefore, when dealing with a statutory scheme with none of
these protections, a statutorily mandated hearing has a high value as a
safeguard. It would help protect against potential erroneous deprivation
and be a reasonable and effective way to comply with the requirements
of due process. "Procedural due process recognizes that when the power
of the government is to be used against an individual, there is a right to
to determine the basis for, and the legality of, such aca fair 13procedure
0
tion."'
While the government undoubtedly has a strong interest in keeping
drunk drivers off the streets, a mandated hearing would not constitute
much of an additional administrative burden on the government. A
123. See id. § 1311(3)(a)-(b).
124. Id. § 1312(3) (emphasis added).

125.
126.
127.
128.

§ 1317(2).
See id.
See id.
§ 1329(1).
See id.
§ 1329(2).
See id.

129. See Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 508 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1986). In that case, New York's
highest court upheld the New York State forfeiture statutory scheme found in Article 13-A of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"). See id. at 158. "[T]he 'statutory procedure
effects a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties' such that procedural due process is satisfled." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

130. Id. at 156.
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hardship hearing for the license suspension is already available,' 3 and
there would not be any need to recreate or overhaul the system, especially because such hearing is already in place.' Even if a hardship
privilege is not requested,' requiring a hearing does not add such a
burden, especially in light of the serious lack of due process protection
that currently exists. Therefore, it is clear that under a Mathews analysis, the present New York City and Nassau County statutory scheme
falls short of providing a defendant with the necessary due process protections.
IV. ExcEsSIvE FINES-EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
A. Invoking the Excessive Fines Clause
This part of the analysis focuses on the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The Excessive Fines Clause provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." ' Here again,
the New York State Con35
stitution contains very similar language.1
The inquiry involves a "punitive versus remedial" analysis. ' 36 If the
forfeiture is in some way considered to be a punishment (and therefore
punitive), then the Excessive Fines Clause is triggered.' 7 Once the Excessive Fines Clause is activated, then another
inquiry must be made to
3
determine if the punishment is excessive. 1
If the forfeiture amounts to a 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,"' then it will invoke Eighth Amendment protection. 139 There is also a distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in
personam criminal forfeitures. The latter, especially those criminal forfeitures in the form of a fine, will almost always trigger Eighth
Amendment protection.' In contrast, the in rem civil forfeitures usually
131. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(2)(e)(7)(e) (McKinney 1999).
132. Cf. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1028 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing an existing state
procedure already in place for ascertaining the removal of children from foster care).
133. Or unavailable, as it will be repealed on Nov. 1,2000. See 1997 N.Y. Laws ch. 131, § 7.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

135. See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5.("Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably
detained.").
136. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1993).
137. See id. at 622.

138. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1998).
139. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

140. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 n.4 (1993).
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initially require the "punitive versus remedial" analysis
41 to determine if
they fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.'
In Austin v. United States, 42 the government advanced two arguments, both unsuccessful, in an attempt to persuade the Court that a forfeiture of a mobile home and body shop (based on drug offenses) was
remedial. 43 The first argument was founded upon the idea that removal
of the instruments of the drug trade will protect the community from the
threat of continued drug dealing.' 44 This was rejected on the grounds that
there was nothing illegal about owning such property 45 The second argument was founded upon the theory that such forfeitures served to
compensate the government for the expenses of law enforcement and
expenditures in society "such as urban blight, drug addiction, and other
health concerns resulting from the drug trade."' 46 This argument was
similarly rejected. 47 The Court held that "'forfeiture of property [in
general is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages
sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law.""' 148 In addition,
the Court went on to hold that "'[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, ' "1 49 and therefore, subject to the limitations of the Eighth
Amendment.' Therefore, if a sanction has any punitive element as its
goal, then that sanction falls within the scope of the Excessive Fines
Clause.'
Indeed, the forfeiture statutes as applied to drunk driving offenses
do not have any application other than for the goals of retribution or

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
509 U.S. 602 (1993).
See id. at 620-21.
See id. at 620.
See id. at 621.
Id. at 620 (citation omitted).
See id. at 621.
Id. (citation omitted).

149. Id.
150. See id. at 622.
151. See id.
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deterrence. Public officials,5 2 as well as the Grinberg court, have conceded to this.""

Since it has been determined that the vehicle forfeiture triggers the
Excessive Fines Clause, it must be analyzed for excessiveness."5 However, in Austin, the Court specifically declined to formulate a test for
excessiveness, and instead deferred that question to the lower courts.'
As a result, several tests have developed. Some courts have adopted the

proportionality test, 56 while other courts follow the instrumentality
test, and still others adhere to a hybrid known as the nexus test.' 58 The
Grinberg court held that under any of the three tests, forfeiture, as applied in the Grinbergsituation, was not excessive.'59
B. Excessiveness

1. The Proportionality Test
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Bajakajian'60 applied the Excessive Fines Clause and utilized the proportionality test to determine if the sanction was in fact excessive.' 6' The proportionality test focuses on the proportion between the amount and
nature of the forfeiture and balances it against the gravity of the offense.' 62

152. See Baker & Durkin, supra note 3, at A5; Morrison, supra note 1, at A37; Nassau
County Press, Gulotta: Unveils DWI Car Seizure Option (Mar. 11,
1999)
<http:llwww.co.nassau.ny.us/3-11-99.htm>; Nassau County Press, Nassau County Executive Thomas S. Gulotta - 1999 State of the County Address (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.co.nassau.ny.us/state.html>.
153. "The ... DWI forfeiture policy is punitive for Eighth Amendment purposes under Austin: It has an 'escape hatch' for innocent owners; it links the forfeited property directly to the
charged crime; it lacks specific correlation between the property's value and the crime's social
cost." Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 327 (Sup. Ct. 1999). The Grinbergcourt bases its reasoning on the principles announced in Austin. Yet it is interesting to note that the judge in Grinberg questions the "current vitality" of Austin in an earlier paragraph. See id. at 321 n.3. Notwithstanding the judge's criticism, the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case, specifically
pointed to Austin as one of the leading cases for Eighth Amendment excessive fines analyses. See
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997).
154. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1998).
155. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993).
156. See Bajakajian,524 U.S. at 334.
157. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994).
158. See United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995).
159. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 327 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
160. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
161. See id. at 334.
162. See id.
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Mr. Bajakajian attempted to transport $357,144 out of the United
States without disclosing it to the proper authorities. 63 Transporting
more than $10,000 out of the country without disclosure to the United
States government violates federal law.' The trial court found that the
entire $357,144 was subject to forfeiture.'65 The Supreme Court held
that this forfeiture fell under the protection of the Excessive Fines
Clause, and employed the proportionality test.' 66 However, it is not a
strict proportionality test; instead, the test requires a forfeiture to be
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. 67 Not suprisingly,
disproporthe Bajakajiancourt held that a fine of
1 $357,144 was grossly
tional to the gravity of such conduct.'
Applying the proportionality test of the Excessive Fines Clause, the
Grinberg court found that the forfeiture was not excessive. 69 Mr. Grinberg's 1988 Acura was found to have a value of $2000."0 Indeed, at first
blush, forfeiture of a car worth approximately $2000 does not seem to
be grossly disproportional since the maximum fine for a first-time DWI
offender is $1000. 7 1 Yet it does not seem correct that the government
has the authority to force an individual to relinquish a property right in a
vehicle. The Second Circuit held that a forfeiture of a condominium
worth $145,000 (where the owner-defendant had a $68,000 equity interest) was not grossly disproportionate to a sale of narcotics in the amount
of $250.17' However, consider the principles the Second Circuit used in
reaching its decision:
[T]he distribution of narcotics, even in quantities as small as those sold
by [the defendant], is a grave offense, for which a defendant could be
fined $50,000 under New York law, $100,000 under Vermont law, and
$1 million under federal law. We concluded that in light of this range
of possible fines, a forfeiture of $68,000 was "not a grossly disproporwithin the meaning of Eighth Amendment juristionate punishment
73
prudence."'1

163.

See id. at 324.

164. See id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1997).
165. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,325 (1998).
166. See id. at 334.

167. Seeid.
168. See id. at324.
169. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 327-28 (Sup. Ct. 1999).

at 328.
170. See id.
171. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § I193(1)(b) (McKinney 1996).
172. See United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1992).
173. United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing 38 Whalers Cove

Drive).
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Granted, drunk driving is a social problem with serious consequences. However, the offense of DWI is a strict liability crime; no
mens rea is required. 74 Thus, an offender's vehicle is subject to forfeiture under this policy, even if that offender did not intend to drive while
intoxicated." As a first-time offense, the offender is charged with a
crime, yet it is only a misdemeanor. 7 6 Notwithstanding the fact that
even misdemeanors can be serious, the State legislature could have, but
did not, respond to the drunk driving problem by increasing the penalty.1 n Therefore, forfeiture of a first-time offender's vehicle under any
circumstances is grossly disproportional to the offense.
A more serious implication is raised in this context. Assuming that
a forfeiture of a car worth $2000 is not excessive, a question arises as to
where the line should be drawn. Using an example for illustrative purposes, assume that the threshold for excessiveness under proportionality
is $20,000. This would set the threshold at twenty times greater than the
maximum fine for the offense. Under this scenario, the law would effectively discriminate against individuals whose car is under $20,000
and insulate individuals from forfeiture whose cars are worth over
$20,000. Such a biased application cannot promote uniform application
of the law, nor does it provide equal protection under the law. Clearly
stated, any forfeiture under the current statutory scheme violates the
proportionality test.
2. The Instrumentality Test
The instrumentality test, rejected by the Court in United States v.
Bajakajian,7 1 focuses on the "guilt of the property" or the extent to
which the property was used in the offense, and not its value.'79 This
test, outlined in UnitedStates v. Chandler,' considers:
I. The nexus between the offense and the property, and the extent
of the property's role in the offense. In measuring the strength and extent between the property and the offense, a court may take into account
the following five factors:
174. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2).
175. See id.
176. See id. § 1193(1)(b). A lesser violation, driving while ability impaired, is only a traffic
infraction and not a misdemeanor. See id. § 1193(1)(a). The maximum fine is $500. See id.
177. There are, however, heightened penalties for subsequent offenses. A second offense of
DWI increases the charge to a class E felony. See id. § 1193(c)(i). A third offense increases the
charge to a class D felony. See id § 1193(c)(ii).
178. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1998).
179. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994).
180. See id. at 365.
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(i) Whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate
and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous;
(ii) Whether the property was important to the success of the illegal activity;
(iii) The time during which the property was illegally used and
the spacial extent of its use;
(iv) Whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been repeated; and
(v) Whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the
property was to carry out the offense.
II. The role and culpability of the owner; and
III. The possibility of separating offending property that can be
readily separated from the remainder."'
No one factor is dispositive, and to sustain a challenge under the
excessive fines analysis, a "court must be able to conclude, under the
totality of circumstances, that the property was a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the offense."'8 2
The Grinberg court did not properly employ the instrumentality
test. Instead of considering the above-mentioned factors of the instrumentality test, the court simply held that the vehicle was the sine qua
non of the offense, and ended the analysis." 3 The court's conclusory
analysis with no regard for the proper test is hardly persuasive. "[Pavel
Grinberg's] vehicle is the instrumentality of a charged crime, inseparable from it, and its prerequisite. [Mr. Grinberg] owns the car and drove
it at the time of the alleged offense. The owner's role and his use of the
property were temporally and spatially coextensive with the offense
charged."' 8 4
Had there been a correct analysis under the instrumentality test, the
Grinberg court would have found that even though the car may have
been the sine qua non of the offense, it was not the "instrumentality" of
the crime. It would therefore follow that the forfeiture was improperly
excessive.
Furthermore, consider the application of the instrumentality test in
United States v. Chandler.'5 Chandler involved the forfeiture of a
home. 6 Yet this was not just a regular, average home. It was secluded,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id.
Id.
See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 327.
36 F.3d 358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 360.
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had a long driveway with a lookout, a security camera, and served as the
situs for over 130 drug transactions that spanned over a period of years
and involved thousands of dollars.' This and other evidence showed
that the drug use permeated to the basement, kitchen, garage, and the
long driveway. 8 Further, the property was maintained and improved by
payments made with drug money.8 9 Therefore, the use of the property
was deliberate and necessary to the success of the drug transactions.
These transactions took place repeatedly over a long period of time, and
the entire property was exploited for such usage. A significant purpose
of maintaining and using the property was to facilitate drug sales. Thus,
it is not difficult to see why the Fourth Circuit held that this was the
proper nexus between the property and the offense.'O
With regards to the second factor (the role and culpability of the
owner), the defendant in Chandler bought the drugs personally, stored
them on his property, paid his employees with drugs, and sold drugs to
others.' 9' The court held that "[Chandler] was not merely aware, but actively involved, in the commission of the illegal conduct."'" Nor was it
possible to separate the offending property from the remainder because
a significant amount of the property was used in the crime."l Therefore,
the court had little difficulty finding that the home was a substantial and
meaningful instrumentality, and that forfeiture of the home did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause. 1'
Compare the Chandler home with the Grinberg car. It is highly
doubtful that a drunk driver's use of a vehicle is "deliberate and
planned." More likely, it is merely an incidental and fortuitous usage.
Additionally, even though the vehicle was a necessary part of the crime,
it was not important to the "success" of drunk driving. Drunk driving
has no "economic success" under Chandler's reasoning. Moreover,
there was no evidence that Pavel Grinberg had driven while intoxicated
at other times. If he had (and been prosecuted), he would have been
charged with a felony offense for this particular incident.' Further-

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. at 366.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

192. Id.

193. See id.
194. See id.
195. A second offense of DWI increases the charge to a class E felony. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.
LAW § 1193(c)(i) (McKinney 1996). A third offense increases the charge to a class D felony. See
id.
§ 1193(c)(ii).
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more, it is doubtful that Pavel Grinberg's purpose of acquiring, maintaining, or using his car was to drive while intoxicated. Therefore, under
Chandler,it is not likely that there was much of a nexus between Pavel
Grinberg's car and the drunk driving, even if it was the sine qua non of
the offense.
There was no intentional violation of the law on Grinberg's part.
New York's drunk driving laws do not require any mens reaY6 Therefore, no culpable mental state is required. Even though Grinberg was
driving the car, there was no evidence that he intended to drive drunk.
Thus, it is clear that a car is not the "instrumentality" of a drunk driving
offense under these circumstances, and its forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause under this test.
3. The Nexus Test
The nexus test, a hybrid of both the instrumentality and proportionality tests, was announced in United States v. Milbrand.'97 This is
also a multi-factor test, and it combines principles from both of the
tests. 98 The nexus test considers:
(1) the harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and value of the
property and the effect of forfeiture on innocent third parties) in comparison to (a) the gravity of the offense, and (b) the sentence that could
be imposed on the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship
between the property and the offense, including whether use of the
property in the offense was (a) important to the success of the illegal
activity, (b) deliberate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous,
and (c) temporally or spatially extensive; and (3) the role and degree of
culpability of the owner of the property 99
Factors two and three of the nexus test are the same as factors one and
two of the instrumentality test. Thus, the analysis under each is the
same.2m However, factor one of the nexus test requires some development.
The forfeiture of one's car is indeed harsh, especially when compared with the gravity of the offense-the first time offense of DWI is a
misdemeanor."' The first time offense of the lesser charge of driving

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Seeid § 1192(2).
58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 847-48.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 178-96.
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193(1)(b) (McKinney 1996).
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while ability impaired ("DWAI") is only a traffic infraction' 2 The
maximum penalties that are imposed for these offenses are: one year in
jail and a $1000 fine for DWI,20 and fifteen days in jail and a $500 fine
for DWAI. 4 As noted earlier, excessiveness based on the value of the
vehicle would be unfair, shielding those with expensive cars and exposing to forfeiture those with lesser-valued cars.
Additionally, there are alternatives to forfeiture currently available.
New York law imposes a license suspension upon arrest, pending prosecution s The provision gives New York State the authority to immediately suspend an individual's license at the arraignment.Y Other possible alternatives could include revocation of the license plates,
registration and inspection of the vehicles of the individual or of the vehicle used in the offense.2 Therefore, under the circumstances, the forfeiture of a car is clearly excessive.
V. DOUBLE JEOPARDY-FIFrH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
A.

The Two-Prong Test

The third part of the Constitutional analysis considers the current
understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... ,2"The New York State Constitution has almost identical language.2
"A defendant convicted and punished for an offense may not have
a nonremedial civil penalty imposed against him for the same offense in
a separate proceeding." 210 Thus, it is necessary to focus on the specific
type of forfeiture provision, and whether it is remedial or punitive.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Seeid.§ 1193(l)(a).
See id. § 1193(1)(b).
See id. § 1193(1)(a).
See id. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(a)-(e).
See id. § 1193(2)(e)(7)(b).
These solutions have not been mandated and are only the author's suggestions.

208.

U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

209. "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6.
210. Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,778 (1994).
211. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267
(1996). But see Susan R. Klein, Redraiving the Criminal-CivilBoundary, 2 BUFm. CRIM. L. REV.

679, 682-88 (1999) (suggesting that the most effective and workable approach is to discard the
extremely polar "criminal vs. civil" test and instead adopt a "middleground jurisprudence" theory).
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Some remedial civil forfeiture proceedings may be considered to be so
punitive in purpose or effect that such forfeiture is the equivalent of a
criminal proceeding. 1 2 It is these forfeitures that are subject to the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.23" Therefore, even
though certain penalties or forfeitures are intended to be civil in nature,
they can be viewed as criminal for the purposes of double jeopardy as a
matter of federal constitutional law.
Thus, the question that remains to be answered is whether or not a
"civil" forfeiture, in its application, can be so punitive that it is actually
considered to be "criminal." Determining which category the forfeiture
falls into requires an in-depth two-step analysis.
First, the statute's legislative intent must be examined.214 This is to
determine if the legislature intended the particular forfeiture to be civil
or criminal.2 5 Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is
2 16
therefore, initially, a matter of statutory construction.
The second step is rather complex. If a statute is intended to be
civil, then a further evaluation must be made to determine whether the
forfeiture is so punitive that it "transform[s] what was clearly intended
as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. '217 In making such an evaluation, seven factors are to be used as "guideposts" in the analysis. 8
However, no one factor should be dispositive or controlling.2 19' The
seven factors are as follows:
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affinative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishmenf'; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of sciente?';
(4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which

"[This would] permit certain punitive sanctions to be imposed in civil actions with heightened
procedural protections." Id. at 682-83.
212. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
213. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 289-90 n.3.
214. See id. at 288.
215. It is interesting to note that the Court does not explicitly rule as to what happens when a
forfeiture proceeding is intended to be criminal. It might be assumed, however, that a forfeiture
that is intended to be criminal (and therefore punitive) would, afortiori,almost certainly be subject to constitutional attack. Yet this is not the case unless there is an "imposition of multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense ... and then only when such [imposition] occurs in
successiveproceedings." Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
216. See id.
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. See id. These seven factors come from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963).
219. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101.
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it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7)
"whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned."t=
"'These factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face,'
and 'only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent
what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal
and transform
'
' 221

penalty.

It is worth mentioning that even Chief Justice Rehnquist noted a
caveat that the court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezm had foreseen
when it created the seven factors. "But as we emphasized in Kennedy
itself, no one factor should be considered controlling as they 'may often
point in differing directions."'t' ' Thus, such a test, while a good basis for
analysis, can be subject to multiple interpretations. It is not difficult to
foresee that judges will weigh certain factors more than other factors,
most likely on their subjective viewpoint of the issue. Because it is the
current test, an analysis under it must be conducted.
Another very important point worth mentioning at this juncture is
that there is a consideration of whether the forfeiture has some purpose
other than the traditional goals behind criminal prosecution: retribution
and, deterrence. It has been held that forfeiture can serve a deterrent purpose that is remedial and not punitive. m This would, for example, involve an economic penalty.'m As the Supreme Court has opined,
"[florfeiture of property prevents illegal uses 'both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty,
thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."'' 6 Many cases in
which the forfeitures were upheld involved similar reasoning. m
Yet the statutes used to seize an individual's car after an arrest for
drunk driving are completely different. No such economic benefit can

220. Id. at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
221. Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted).
222. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
223. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted).
224. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996).
225. See id.
226. Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).
227. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105 (1997) (promoting the stability of
the banking industry); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 291 (1996) (removing the profit from
distributing illegal drugs); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365
(1984) (discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 466
(1926) (upholding forfeiture of vehicle to prohibit illicit transportation of alcohol during Prohibition).
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be gained from the illegal use of a car in a drunk driving offense.' Indeed, public officials concede that the only use of these statutes is to
deter the conduct.' No economic reason or goal exists at all. Take,
however, the goals behind forfeitures for the smuggling of drugs or
weapons. When a person's car or home is seized because of those types
of charges, that person is effectively prevented from using that car or
home to make money from the illegal activity.2 Consider the example
of the drug dealer who conducts his illicit business from his vehicle.
Under this reasoning, the law would allow a drug dealer's car to be forfeited if the drug dealer did in fact use the car to make drug transactions.
Forfeiture would effectively prevent the dealer from using that car to
conduct further drug transactions, thereby imposing an economic penalty. This undoubtedly makes the illegal behavior unprofitable (it removes the profit from the drug deal) and fits within the Supreme
Court's reasoning. Since the goal of drunk driving forfeitures is only to
deter, it fails the "profit" test, and is arguably punitive for double jeopardy purposes. Therefore, under the framework established by the Supreme Court, the argument for violation of double jeopardy is much
stronger in drunk driving forfeiture cases.
B. The Leading Cases
1. United States v. Ursery
In United States v. Ursery,2 3' the defendants were charged with
drug and money laundering offenses. 232 The United States attempted to3
forfeit defendants' property that was used in facilitating these crimes .2
The Supreme Court held that the civil forfeitures in question did not
constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.2
In answering the initial "intent" question, the Court pointed to several factors and principles. First, these forfeiture statutes were entitled

228. Unless however, the individual is someone who earns a living from making deliveries.
229. See Morrison, supranote 1, at A37.
230. See cases cited supra note 227; see also cases cited infra note 243.

231. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
232.
facts and
233.
234.

See id at 271. The case was actually a consolidation of two separate cases with similar
similar claims. See id. at 270.
See id. at 272.
See id. at 270-71.
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"civil forfeiture." ' Second, the Court found the statutes to be in rem,
and not in personam, because the forfeitures were specifically structured
to be impersonal by targeting the property itself.36 Apparently, the
Court made a theoretical distinction between a proceeding "against a
thing" (in rem) and a proceeding "against a person" (in personam).
Third, the Court held that forfeitures designated by Congress to be civil,
which proceed in rem, are presumptively not subject to double jeopardy
constitutional protection. 7 Thus, these particular statutes were, for the
purposes of the "intent" question, considered civil. The Court then
turned to the second prong of the analysis.
The Court noted that when the "clearest proof' indicates that an in
rem civil forfeiture is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to be
equivalent to a criminal proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause will
take effect, regardless of legislative intent 3s Applying the Kennedy
factors, the Court found that the burden of "clearest proof' had not been
met. 9
The Court also considered several other factors in making its determination. First, it held that it was "absolutely clear" that in rem civil
4 Second, it
forfeiture had not been historically regarded as punishment."
held that there was no requirement in the statutes at issue that the government demonstrate scienter; the property may be subject to forfeiture,
even though the government never demonstrates any connection between the property and a particular person. 4 '
However, most important to the Ursery court was the fact that the
forfeiture statutes at issue, while having certain punitive aspects, also
served an important remedial goal.242 The remedial goal to which it was
referring was that such forfeitures imposed an economic penalty on the

235. See id. at 288. However, this is not entirely correct. See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994); see also
21 U.S.C. § 881 (Supp. 1998). The title of 18 U.S.C. § 981 is labeled "Civil [F]orfeiture." Contrary to the Court's opinion, the title of 21 U.S.C. § 881 is only labeled as "Forfeitures." In addition, in the section dealing with the disposition of such forfeited property, the statute reads:
"Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this subchapter .... Id. § 881(e)(1)
(emphasis added).
236. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 289.
237. See id. at 289 n.3.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 290-92.
240. See id. at 291. This is Kennedy factor number two.
241. See id. at 291-92. This is Kennedy factor number three. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)
(Supp. 1998) and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1994) which are the forfeiture statutesat issue in the
case. No connection is required between the property and any individual in either section 881(a)(6)
or section 981(a)(1)(A).
242. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290. This is Kennedy factor number six.
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offender. Such a penalty, the court reasoned, ensured that offenders
would not profit from their illegal acts. 3 This is the same recurring
theme that occurs in the line of double jeopardy cases.'
2. Hudson v. United States
In 1992, in Hudson v. United States,2
'4 criminal charges were
brought against the defendants, three years after they paid fines to the
United States government for their role in a bank fraud scheme.246 In the
1989 ,action, the defendants were also barred from participating "in the
affairs of any banking institution" without the written authorization of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and other relevant regulatory agencies.4 7 The 1992 criminal charges were grounded upon the
same transactions in which the 1989 fines and debarment rested.2 8 The
issue was whether or not the 1989 proceeding amounted to "criminal"
sanctions. 24' If it did, then the government would have been precluded
from the 1992 criminal prosecution2 0 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
held that such penalties were not violative of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."~
Regarding the "intent" question, the Court held that the 1989 action was civil and not criminal. 2 It based its holding on a similar analysis as the one in Ursery. The Hudson court held that the statutes were
civil because the authority to issue the debarment orders was conferred
upon the "appropriate Federal banking agencies.'O'"That such authority
was conferred upon administrative agencies is primafacie evidence that
Congress intended to provide for a civil sanction." This was the case

243. See id. at 291. This was the backbone of the Court's "clearest proof' analysis. See, e.g.,
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (discussing forfeiture of a motor vehicle where it
was used to facilitate prostitution); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232
(1972) (describing how forfeiture prevented smuggling merchandise into the United States); see
also supra note 215.
244. See supranotes 227, 243.
245. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
246. See id. at 93 The trial court dismissed the indictment and the government appealed, resuiting in a reversal. See id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision. See id. at 98.
247. Id. at 97.

248. See id. at 97-98.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

See id. at 98.
See id.
See id. at 105.
See id. at 103.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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in light of the fact that there was no'' 5specific
language that explicitly
s
stated that such penalties were "civil. 2
Moving to the second prong of the analysis, the Court found that
there was little evidence, much less any of the required "clearest proof'
to suggest that any of the penalties were criminal2 6 The Court applied
the Kennedy factors in making its determination. First, it held that
money penalties and disbarment had not been historically viewed as
punishment257 Second, it held that the sanctions did not involve an "affirmative disability or restraint." 5 Although Mr. Hudson was prohibited
from further participating in the banking industry, this was "'certainly
nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment."' 9
"Third, neither sanction comes into play 'only' on a finding of scienter. , '
As seen in Ursery, the existence of economic reasoning plays a
major role. Here, the Court held that the fines and debarment served to
promote the stability of the banking industry.26' The Court reasoned that
if such sanctions were found violative of double jeopardy, it would "severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions such as banks."6 2
C. The New York Statutes and Double Jeopardy
1. The "Intent" of the Statutes
Turning to the New York statutes in question, an analysis is necessary in light of the previously mentioned factors and considerations.
Clear arguments can be made that these laws violate double jeopardy
principles under the particular framework established by Ursery and
Hudson.

255. See id.
256. See id. at 104.
257. See id. This is Kennedy factor number two. "'[R]evocation of a privilege voluntarily
granted,' such as a debarment, 'is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.' Similarly, 'the payment of fixed or variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized
as enforcible by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789."' Id. (second and third
alteration in original) (citations omitted).

258. See id. This is Kennedy factor number one.
259. Id. (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
260. Id. This is Kennedy factor number three. The statutes at issue in Hudson were 12

U.S.C.

§§ 93(b)(2), 504(b), 1818(e) (1994).
261. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105.
262. Id.
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As previously mentioned, the first prong of the double jeopardy
analysis involves both legislative intent and statutory construction.2 6 3
However, the most persuasive argument for violation of double jeopardy with respect to the New York statutes is demonstrated in the second prong.
The New York City statute at issue, NYCAC section 14-140,
authorizes the police commissioner to "use" or "convert to use" a pera crime.26
son's vehicle when that vehicle has been used in committing
In Ursery, the Court held that in rem forfeiture statutes, designated as
"civil," are presumptively not subject to double jeopardy.m
Nowhere in NYCAC section 14-140 are the words "civil forfeiture" used. This, however, is not controlling.2 6 On the other hand,
NYCAC section 14-140 targets property and therefore applies in rem
principles.267 Therefore, even though it is arguable that the forfeiture is
intended to be criminal because the statute authorizes action by the police commissioner,26 and not an administrative agency, 26' it is unlikely
that section 14-140 could fail on double jeopardy grounds at this stage.
The argument for violation of double jeopardy with respect to the
Nassau County statute at this stage is even weaker. The statute, NCAC
section 8-7.0, authorizes Nassau County to "commence a civil action for
forfeiture." 2'0 Thus, under Ursery, it is even less likely that forfeiture
under this statute would be considered to be criminal at this stage.
2. So Punitive to be Criminal?
At this point, it is necessary to conduct an analysis to determine
whether the forfeitures under these two statutes are so punitive that the
civil remedy is transformed into a criminal penalty. If so, then under
this second prong of the double jeopardy analysis, an intended civil forfeiture will be deemed criminal and violate double jeopardy. An examination of the Kennedy factors27' applied to the New York statutes is
therefore pertinent.

263.

See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.

264. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 14-140(e)(2) (1999).
265. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 289 n.3 (1996).
266. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103.
267. See N.Y.C. ADMiN. CODE § 14-140(e)(2), (b).
268. See id. § 14-140(e)(2).
269. As in Hudson. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103.
270. See NASSAU COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-7.0(g)(3) (1990) (emphasis added); see
also § 8-7.0(g)(5) ("A civil action seeking forfeiture brought under this section ....) (emphasis
added).
271. See supra notes 220 and accompanying text.
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In their application, no one factor should be dispositive or controlling.2 The Hudson Court also noted an inherent fault in the Kennedy

factor analysis: these factors "'may often point in differing directions."'273 Indeed, such is the case here. As applied to the New York
statutes, Kennedy factors one,2 7 two, 2 s three,2 6 and five2 ' do not suggest
a violation of double jeopardy. In contrast, factors four,"2s six,29 and
seven suggest that a violation of double jeopardy does exist.

An affirmative disability or restraint does not exist here. An individual whose vehicle is seized can still work, socialize, and perform all
other functions. Even in Hudson, where the defendants were prohibited
from further participation in the banking industry, the Court held that no
such disability or restraint existed." The Court has also generally held
that in rem civil forfeiture has not been historically regarded as punish-

ment.

2

Nor does the forfeiture apply only upon a finding of scienter.

When the "property may be subject to forfeiture even if ... the Government never shows any connection between the property and a particular person," then there is no requirement of scienter.23 Finally, even
though the behavior to which the forfeiture applies is already a crime, it

has been held that the Government can impose a civil and a criminal
penalty with respect to the same conduct. m

272. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted).
273. Id. (citation omitted).
274. "Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
275. "[W]hether [the sanction] has historically been regarded as a punishment." Id.
276. "[W]hether [the sanction] comes into play only on a finding of scienter." Id.
277. "[W]hether the behavior to which [the sanction] applies is already a crime." Id.
278. "[W]hether [the sanction's] operation will promote the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence." Id.
279. "[V]hether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it." Id. at 168-69.
280. "[W]hether [the sanction] appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." Id. at 169.
281. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). According to the Court, it would
seem that the only kind of disability or restraint that would meet the threshold would be imprisonment. See id. "While petitioners have been prohibited from further participating in the banking
industry, this is 'certainly nothing approaching the "infamous punishment" of imprisonment."' Id.
282. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,291 (1996).
283. Id. at 291-92.
284. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). Yet if
the Court is suggesting that the Government can impose a civil and a criminal penalty with respect
to the same conduct in all cases, then the Court is effectively eliminating this factor from the
analysis. But see Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994). In that
case, it was held that a drug tax based on the commission of a crime was the second punishment of
a criminal offense and hence, violative of the double jeopardy clause. See id. "[Tihis [penalty] is
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Yet, as we have already seen, even though the penalty may be
called civil, it is really a punitive measure. Examining the statutes and
their application leads one to the conclusion that they promote the traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence.2s Moreover, public officials concede this fact.' Indeed, the only rational purpose behind
such a policy is to deter individuals from drinking and driving, by
making them pay for such conduct.' Alternative purposes do not exist.
Simply stated, the goals are to achieve a lower rate of DWI offenses
(deterrence) and to make offenders pay a heavier debt to society (retribution). Therefore, on its face, this clearly supports a strong argument
that double jeopardy is violated.
Additionally, consider the following cases in which the double
jeopardy argument has not prevailed. Notice that in each one, the goal
of the penalty was economic, not punitive. For example, in Hudson v.
United States,29 the Court upheld the sanctions because they promoted
the stability of the banking industry.29 In United States v. Ursery,2'° the
forfeiture was upheld because it removed the profit from distributing
illegal drugs.2 In Bennis v. Michigan,292 the forfeiture of a motor vehi2 3
In United
cle was upheld where it was used to facilitate prostitution.Y
294
upheld
was
forfeiture
the
Firearms,
of
89
Assortment
v.
One
States
295 In One Lot
in
firearms.
because it discouraged unregulated commerce
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,296 the forfeiture was upheld because it prevented smuggling merchandise into the United States.2 97 In
Van Oster v. Kansas,29' the forfeiture was upheld because it helped prohibit illicit transportation of alcohol during the Prohibition era.299 In all
of these cases, the forfeiture or sanction was upheld because it took
away the profit from the criminal act. This reveals the common thread
conditioned on the commission of a crime. That condition is 'significant of penal and prohibitory
intent rather than the gathering of revenue."' Id. at 781.
285. See sources cited supra note 152.
286. See sources cited supra note 152.
287. See sources cited supra note 152.
288. 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
289. See id. at 105.

290. 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
291. Seeid. at291.
292. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).

293. See id at 443.
294. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
295. See id. at 364.
296. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
297. See id. at 237.
298. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).

299. See id. at 466.
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that lies at the core of these decisions. Therefore, it is absolutely clear
that the existence of an economic penalty is a major factor. It is also just
as clear that when there is a complete lack of economic penalty, as is the
case here, double jeopardy is violated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While seizing an individual's car upon arrest for a drunk driving
offense may seem praiseworthy, it is necessary to consider the extremely important and unavoidable Constitutional protections that the
Founding Fathers created. At present, the New York City and Nassau
County forfeiture statutes are severely lacking in Due Process protection, and also violate the Excessive Fines Clause and Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution. It follows that they contravene
the analogous sections of the New York State Constitution as well.
Even if it might be argued, however, that the Federal Constitution
is not violated, the New York State Constitution should provide a higher
standard of protection for its citizens from such authority. The Grinberg
decision argues to the contrary, suggesting that New York's Constitution is not often interpreted more broadly than the Federal Constitution.3 ° Yet this is not the case. As stated by New York's highest court in
1992, "[a]n independent construction of our own State Constitution is
particularly appropriate where a sharp or sudden change in direction by
the United States Supreme Court dramatically narrows fundamental
constitutional rights that our citizens have long assumed to be part of
their birthright." 3° Therefore, it would not be unusual nor out of the ordinary for New York's highest court to hold that the current forfeiture
statutes are violative of New York's Constitution.
Additionally, if this case were ultimately to reach the United States
Supreme Court, it is not unlikely that the Court would hold that the statutes are violative. This is due especially to the recent push in Congress
to provide greater due process protections for owners of property seized
by the government in civil actions.m The 'Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act' reflects the growing concern that our forfeiture laws are being used
in terribly unjust ways and depriving citizens of their property without

300. See Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316,326 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
301. People v. Scott, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 934 (1992).
302. See Rhonda McMillion, Getting a Grip on Seizure Laws: Bill Seeks GreaterDue Process Protectionsin CivilAsset ForfeitureCases, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 92.
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any measure of due process. 303 This Act has been passed by the House of
Representatives overwhelningly, 34 and is still pending in the Senate.0 5
Indeed, our application of forfeiture law has drifted in the direction
of the extreme. Recently, the Mayor of New York proposed a new policy, authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles in which the motorist has been charged with driving recklessly.3 The criteria for seizure
in these cases is based on the commission of multiple (three or more)
traffic infractionsw Some examples of infractions include speeding, unsafe lane changing, and following too closely."' Such a radical application is nothing more than executive abuse of our system. When the New
York City and Nassau County forfeiture statutes are applied, George
Orwell's 1984 does not seem to be that far away.
Michael J. Langer*

303. See id.
304. See id.

305. See S. 1931, 106th Cong. (1999).
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(Queens) Jan. 14, 2000, at A5.

307. See Sean Gardiner, Cops May Seize Cars of Reckless, NEvSDAY (Queens), Jan. 14,

2000, at A33.
308. See id.
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